Finance may be the most powerful weapon of war. It moves armadas, armies, and squadrons. It funds troops and artillery. It endows suicide bombs and improvised explosive devices. It pays for special forces and mercenaries. It underwrites cease-fires and purchases surrenders. Finance is the weapon that makes all other weapons of war possible. ... This Article is about the financial weapons of war, their growing importance in national affairs, and their wide-ranging effects on law, finance, and society. This Article offers an early, broad examination of the realities of modern financial warfare. This Article descriptively and normatively explores the new financial theater of war, analyzes the modern arsenal of financial weapons, highlights emerging legal and policy concerns, and proposes key recommendations for current and future financial warfare. ... While policymakers, analysts, and scholars have long been studying the respective, evolving fields of modern finance and modern warfare, there has been surprisingly little meaningful legal scholarship on the crosscutting realities of modern financial warfare. Drawing on a rich legal literature that spans the laws of war, finance, and cyberspace, this Article seeks to fill this understudied, underappreciated—yet critically important—legal intersection of war and finance. ... Part I provides a general layout of the modern financial theater of war. It describes the modern financial infrastructure as a globalized, high-tech, American-centric system. ... Part II highlights particular armaments of financial warfare. Rather than provide an exhaustive catalog of financial weapons, it offers a broad inventory of the financial weapons of war. It classifies the financial weapons of war as analog weapons and cyber weapons. ... Part III contends with new concerns. It asserts that the financial weapons of war present critical challenges for traditional laws and norms relating to financial hostilities, cyberattacks, and non-state actors. ... Part IV offers new pathways. It proposes three pragmatic policy recommendations that should be undertaken in the near term response to modern financial warfare while larger issues remain unresolved by global policymakers.
What made the case fascinating—what had the entire London financial scene watching and waiting for the precedent it might set—was that the defendants’ version of events wasn’t so different from that of the prosecution. Parvizi and the others acknowledged joining up to trade. They acknowledged disguising their activities with encrypted devices and burner phones. But, they maintained, they’d never knowingly traded on information that was, legally speaking, “insider.” The men said their investments, even those that were incredibly well-timed, stayed on the legal side of the line between privileged information and well-informed rumor. ... The trial ran for four months, and at times Courtroom 3 became a circus. Anderson suffered a heart scare after two days on the stand, repeatedly delaying the proceedings. A reality-TV star sat in the audience. Harrison, making the most of the judge’s direction that the men could come and go as they pleased, barely showed up. Parvizi maintained his cool, even when his character was being savaged. During cross-examination, the lead prosecutor observed that lying appeared to come easily to him. Matter-of-factly, Parvizi replied, “Of course.”
As he fielded guilty pleas throughout 2015, Davis thought about how he might offer leniency to the conspiracy’s least culpable members. He could do so only if he knew for sure that the men would never again be tempted by jihadism. To that end, Davis began to research whether there are effective therapies for reforming extremists. He hoped to find a credible way to transform Yusuf and his friends back into the ordinary young men they’d once been. This could spare the youths years behind bars—an act of compassion that would undermine the Islamic State narrative that the West despises its Muslim citizens. ... Davis discovered that numerous nations, from Denmark to Indonesia, have developed methods for nudging young men and women back from the extremist brink—a process known as deradicalization. The judge became intent on starting the first laboratory for deradicalization in the US; he just needed to find an expert he could trust, someone with a proven track record of liberating young minds from violent extremism. ... Koehler’s key finding has been that all extremists, regardless of ideology, develop a sort of tunnel vision as they go through the indoctrination process. ... Koehler sees little point in starting moral or theological arguments with these young people, who are more interested in becoming warriors than debating the finer points of scripture. Instead, he advocates repluralization: the careful reintroduction of problems and solutions into a radicalized person’s life, so that they can no longer devote all their mental energy to stewing over their paranoia. ... Koehler believes that each client needs at least four mentors plus an “intervention coordinator” and that full deradicalization can be achieved only after a matter of years, not months.